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Abstract
I discuss three families of methodologies that could be used to assign values
to the normative parameters relevant to social discounting in welfare economics
generally, and climate economics more specifically. First, I argue that in particular
circumstances, there cannot be philosophical argumentation for normative ques-
tions; specifically, this occurs when the particular values being sought are both
non-critical and from a quantitative range. Second, I argue that social preferences
are insufficient if we take the problem to be normative and that proposals for in-
formed social preferences face significant challenges in implementation. Finally,
I argue in favour of expert elicitation for experts in welfare economics, construed
as those who understand the theoretical implications of adopting particular judg-
ments. Those who understand the theoretical implications of adopting particular
judgments will be better placed to develop coherent social plans while integrating
relevant empirical data.
Keywords: social discount rate, climate change, normative expertise, economic
methodology
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1 Introduction
Weighting the value of the present against the future is a normative matter.1 By norma-
tive, I mean roughly that given any set of empirical data, it remains an open question
how society, or a benevolent social planner, should or ought to weight the present com-
pared to the future.2 It is thus not a matter of normativity whether we (predictably) will
1Economists might be more comfortable saying that particular parameter assignments are value-laden
or subjective judgments (Arrow et al. 2004; Weitzman 2001) or are policy parameters (Pindyck 2013). In
this context, all these terms are roughly equivalent, since the upshot is that empirical data alone does not
suffice to adjudicate correct values.
2Another way of saying this is that not just empirical information, but also value-judgments, feed into
truly normative judgments.
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weight the present against the future in any given way. Stated baldly like this, the norma-
tivity of this weighting may sound to some self-evident (especially among philosophers)
and to others wrong-headed (especially among American economists). Here, however,
I am less interested in discussing whether the claim is true or not, since that has ex-
tensively been done elsewhere (e.g. Arrow et al. 1996; Broome 1992, 2012; Dasgupta
2008; Nordhaus 2007; Stern 2007). Instead, I want to introduce a particular worry that
would follow from accepting this claim, and then suggest a solution. In particular, I
argue (a) that the kind of normative disagreement in welfare economics which is rel-
evant is unusually recalcitrant compared to many other normative problems in moral
philosophy and (b) that we should respond to this by appealing to experts in welfare
economics. In the jargon, I explicate and defend a particular form of prescriptivism in
the discounting debate.
The framework I work with is consequentialist, was developed by Ramsey (1928),
and was subsequently extended by Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), so it is some-
times called the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. The original framework was devel-
oped to answer questions about optimal savings rates, but it is now used inter alia to
evaluate the costs and benefits of marginal projects.3 The framework introduces pa-
rameters which govern the weighting of the present and the future, and the normative
judgments I am interested in are various value assignments to those particular parame-
ters. The context most relevant here, of course, is application of this familiar model to
the analysis of policies concerning a relatively new long-term problem: climate change.
It is common to write our social welfare function (SWF) for some homogenous
population as follows:
W =
∫ ∞
t=0
U(ct)e−δtdt
where ct is the consumption of an individual at time t, U(c) is the concave utility function
of consumption, and δ is called the pure rate of time preference or the utility discount
rate. Positive values of δ weight the future less than the present in an exponentially
increasing manner. Assuming a simple and accommodating form, constant relative
inequity aversion, U(ct) will take the form
c1−ηt
1−η , for some 1 , η > 0, and ln ct for
η = 1, where η measures inequity aversion and higher values indicate greater aversion
to inequity (in short, η > 1 indicates “progressive” increases in utility with respect to
3There are important questions about the limitations of the model (e.g. Pindyck 2013; Stern 2015)
as well as the welfarist and utilitarian assumptions that underlie it (e.g. Caney 2014; Shrader-Frechette
2014, Ch. 13), but my intentions here are narrow—which questions arise given the model, not what are
the questions we can ask about it. Some may be happy to address the questions I raise by rejecting the
presumptions underlying Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans, although my discussion may still hold value for them
at least because the recalcitrance identified in §2 applies outside of this particular framework. It may also
be of interest to have the opposing position in a more fully fleshed-out form.
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consumption and 0 < η < 1 indicate “regressive” increases in utility with respect to
consumption).4
Under idealized conditions, the optimal social discount rate S DR, as applied to con-
sumption, can be derived by maximizing the SWF subject to budget constraints, yielding
the well-known Ramsey equation:
S DR = δ + ηg
where g is the (annual) per capita real growth rate of consumption (ct).5 This is familiar,
as is my flagging of δ and η as the normative parameters in the Ramsey equation. A
helpful distinction will be addressing discounting at the S DR-level—i.e. trying to find a
value for S DR directly—and at the component-level—i.e. trying to find values of δ and
η and determining S DR from those values.
The judgments or preferences relevant to the discussion of discounting are assign-
ments of particular values to these parameters. I call the assignment of values to these
parameters the normative question, or the question of weighting the future against the
present. In this essay, I critically discuss three families of methodologies for answer-
ing the question: those rooted in philosophical argumentation, those rooted in social
preferences, and those rooted in expert preferences.
2 On When to Argue
Disagreement with respect to normative matters (“normative disagreement” for short)
is pervasive in moral philosophy; it applies at levels ranging from particular judgments
and intuitions to principles and rules and from the ontological status of morality to the
semantic status of normative statem nts. Moral philosophers of course do not just sit on
their hands in response to normative disagreement. They argue; that is, they try to give
sets of premises and conclusions which bear certain logical relations to each other, usu-
ally aiming at deductive validity. By arguing, I intend that philosophical argumentation
is something more demanding or principled than merely trading normative intuitions
and seemings.6 Compare an alternative instance of normative disagreement. For most
4Some have argued for a prioritarian form of the SWF (Adler 2012), with an additional concave
transform of utility, e.g. h(U(ct)). Under Atkinson/isoelastic forms, the h function can be characterized
by another parameter, say γ just as η characterizes utility as a function of consumption. I believe that
utilitarians would take h to be the identity function (equivalently, they would take the limit case where
γ = 0). In this more generalized framework, the parameter γ should, of course, be seen as another
normative parameter like η and δ.
5The unflagging optimism of the dismal science can be found in its use of g as the name of the variable
in question.
6For an influential account distinguishing between moral seemings and intuitions, see (Audi 2013).
For my purposes, it is most important that neither is formed through explicit reasoning processes from
first principles.
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1. We can make philosophical arguments for conclusions with particular values
when they can be supported by premises with particular values.
2. Particular values can have empirical or normative sources.
3. Normative sources are not forthcoming when particular values are non-critical
and from a quantitative range.
4. Empirical sources cannot support conclusions which are normative.
∴ 5. Therefore, neither empirical nor normative sources are able to support normative
conclusions with particular non-critical values and from a quantitative range [3,4].
6. Some normative judgments for parameter assignments in climate economics are
for particular values which are non-critical and from a quantitative range.
∴ 7. Therefore, we cannot make philosophical arguments for some normative conclu-
sions for parameter assignments in climate economics [1,2,5,6].
Figure 1: An Argument about Limitations of Argumentation
if not all actions φ, a moral theory will assign φ-ing some deontic status, such as per-
missible, impermissible, obligatory, or supererogatory. When arguing about the status
of φ-ing, more can be offered in defence of a particular status than simple seemings—
namely, a theory which generates a judgment about that status. This appeal to theories
(or principles broadly construed) is a prototypical way that a normative status is de-
fended by philosophical argumentation. So in response to the normative disagreement
attached to normative parameter assignments in climate economics, a natural response
is to suggest that philosophical argumentation can allow for rational and reasoned con-
vergence (or at least clarification) in parameter assignments. In this section, I argue that
this methodology will not be able to do this work, at least not directly by arguments
in favour of particular values for the normative parameters. Figure 1 is a formalized
version of my argument.
The types of judgments that we have normative disagreement about in this climate
discounting debate—i.e. assignments of particular values to the normative parameters—
are less amenable to the approach of philosophical argumentation than many other de-
bates. Why? Because the parameters govern a quantitative range of possible values.
The usual purpose of arguments in moral philosophy is to prove that particular actions
or objects possess normative properties, such as rightness or goodness. Another way of
saying this is that philosophical argumentation is applicable when the range of norma-
tive judgments is qualitative, but not when it it is quantitative.
One way that this difficulty rears its head is in philosophical arguments that there
4
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must be some particular threshold for some normatively relevant property, but any con-
crete suggestions for that threshold end up being subject to objections of arbitrariness;
there is no further normative argumentation that can be brought to defend the threshold
if considered as part of a merely quantitative continuum.
In other words, philosophical argumentation is most helpful for qualitative targets,
such as determining whether an object has or does not have a particular property (e.g.
an action’s being permissible or impermissible). More generally, we can say that ar-
guments are appropriate when the potential values are qualitative (permissible, imper-
missible, and obligatory being particular qualitative “values” in this sense). To be clear,
when I say particular values, I do not mean value in the sense of value theory, but just
assignments to a variable. Philosophical argumentation may also be helpful in some
special cases when there are focal values which correspond with mathematical “critical
values” (e.g. maxima, minima, inflection points).7 However, aside from such special
cases, I suggest, philosophical arguments must fall silent.
Sorites arguments are emblematic of the issue.8 In a sorites argument, one extreme
case is claimed to have some property (e.g. being a heap of sand); there are a series of
cases with only quantitative differences (e.g. piles of sand, each with one less succes-
sive grain of sand); a claim that for all cases, the quantitative difference cannot make
a qualitative difference (e.g. one grain of sand cannot distinguish between a heap and
a non-heap); and a claim that another extreme case does not have that property (e.g. a
single grain of sand is not a heap of sand). These claims yield a contradiction, but are
all supposed to be plausible. How does this relate to my argument? Philosophical ar-
gumentation can establish that there is a qualitative difference (accompanying a merely
quantitative difference) at some point (i.e. the difference claim cannot hold for every
case), but philosophical argumentation cannot be adduced for precisely where, as my
argument suggests. One might think that philosophical argument is still helpful here;
at least an instance of sorites tells us about the critical values of the range, namely that
one has a property that the other lacks. However, it is not philosophical argument itself
which tells us this: that the extreme cases have or lack a particular property arises from
an appeal to intuition about common linguistic usage.
Another way we can see the more limited use of philosophical argumentation in the
context of weighting the future against the present is by considering where the philo-
sophical discussion has been focussed: arguments that δ = 0 (e.g. Broome 1992, 1994;
Caney 2008, 2009, 2014; Meyer and Roser 2012; Parfit 1984; Sidgwick 1981).9 This is
because philosophical argumentation is best suited to critical values. The value δ = 0
7A critical value is usually found by setting the derivative of a function to zero; maxima, minima and
inflection points can be identified in this manner.
8I do think that my argument applies beyond normative conclusions, and I discuss this possibility
below. Obviously, sorites arguments are usually not intended to demonstrate any normative claims.
9Sometimes there is imprecision about whether philosophers argue that δ = 0 or that S DR = 0, but I
think it more charitable to read them all as arguing for the former.
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is a minimum—notice that there is no relevant maximum δ which is similarly a critical
value, and we also see no philosophical argumentation aimed at particular non-zero val-
ues of δ. The problem is that this relegates philosophical argument to a very small part
of the pertinent discussion space, and helps isolate philosophers from discussions of η
which does not have relevant critical points.10
Others have had related concerns, but this particular worry has not been expressed.
For instance, Moellendorf (2014, and work in progress) writes that “there is no basis in
reason or fact” for particular parameter assignments. Related worries prompted Manne
(1995, p. 392) to write that the “rate of time preference and the elasticity of marginal
utility are inherently subjective, and there is no generally agreed-upon way to determine
their values”.11 Broome (1999) writes in the introduction that philosophers are less
likely to think comparatively than economists. This is another similar thought. How-
ever, I am not aware of others who have specifically linked this to limitations to the
potential targets in philosophical argumentation.
Normative problems of this type, i.e. with a quantitative range of values which
lack critical points, are recalcitrant to direct philosophical argumentation. It is not—I
suggest—possible for philosophical arguments to demonstrate evaluative or compara-
tive claims in this context, e.g. that η = 1.3 is normatively correct or that η = 1.3 is more
normatively correct than η = 1.9. Philosophical argumentation underdetermines the an-
swer to this question. Obviously, the issue under discussion—discounting or weighting
of the present against the future—is only an example of a much larger potential class of
such recalcitrant problems.
There are at least two ways the conditions on this argument could be relaxed, mak-
ing for a stronger claim. First, the argument does not require that we are considering
specifically normative judgments, so we could relax the domain. Normative judgments
are defined to be independent of (merely) empirical considerations; in short, given any
empirical results, genuinely normative questions remain open. But there may be other
classes of judgments which are non-normative that this argument applies to, such as on-
tological and metaphysical claims, as long as they involve particular non-critical values
from a quantitative range. To illustrate the normative version in this context, it may be
that some group of individuals, selected in any desired manner, either state or reveal par-
ticular levels of relative risk aversion, which we can model with a constant relative risk
aversion utility function characterized by η = n, where n is a (non-negative) real num-
10Technically speaking, of course, η = 0 is also a minimum since η is defined be always non-negative,
but this parameter assignment corresponds to a linear utility function, and decreasing marginal utility of
consumption is taken to be indispensable, for both psychological and theoretical reasons. For one thing,
distributing consumption differently would not have any effect on social value if η = 0 were adopted,
and this contradicts deep intuitions about equity and fairness, as well as making some relevant questions
trivial.
11Although perhaps this should be read as an objection to phenomena which are difficult to examine
empirically.
6
Pr
ep
rin
t-C
ite
ab
le
via
Ph
il.S
ci.
ber.12 If, as we are assuming for the purposes of this essay, the social welfare function
we should use as a society is genuinely normative, this does not tell us which function to
use. This is true regardless of the group or how it is selected (i.e. by simple random sam-
ple, regional representative selection) or even if (per impossible) the group is a census
of all affected by potential policies. Note that this does not mean that such data would
be unimportant, either normatively or otherwise. I think it normatively relevant, just not
normatively determinate (I return to this discussion in §3). I return to how philosophers
can respond to this argument after introducing the second potential relaxation.
Second, I do not think that all critical points can be addressed by philosophical
argumentation. However, I am less sure when this can be relaxed, so I do not include
in the basic argument. For an example in the current context, under the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans framework, with the assumption of constant relative risk aversion, η = 1 is
a critical value: it represents a discontinuity in functional forms of the utility function
(specifically, by definition, η = 1 generates a logarithmic utility function, but it is not
continuous because in standard representations, setting η = 1 leads to dividing by 0).
But I am not aware of a way that this helps philosophical argumentation to be more
helpful in this context, such as by arguing for the claim that η = 1 is the (or a) correct
value or that η , 1 is normatively more defensible than η = 1.
One important implication of this argument is that, if, for instance, we adopt a moral
realism where those truths do include content about non-critical, particular values in
quantitative domains, we cannot argue for such truths (at least not directly). Similar
remarks apply in other relevant domains.
However, there is a way that philosophers can get around this limitation and con-
tribute meaningfully to this debate, without relegating their arguments to a small part
of the discussion space. This is to apply philosophical argumentation to the various
methodologies used to assign parameter values, without arguing directly for particular
parameter assignments themselves.
One might think that this is unlikely to help, since arguing about methodology ap-
pears to be merely a slightly removed or abstracted way of arguing about the values
themselves. However, this is not the case. Arguments about ways or methodologies of
determining particular values need not themselves appeal to particular values in some
range, such as by including particular values in premises.
For this reason, the following sections rely upon philosophical examination of method-
ologies, not of particular values. Of course, adoption of a particular methodology con-
joined with relevant empirical work will generate particular values, but we cannot di-
rectly argue for particular, non-critical values.
12There are likely to be many more issues, since given any set of stated or revealed preferences, it is
unlikely that the resultant utility function would be representable so simply, but I can grant these issues
for the sake of argument.
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3 On When to Listen to Everyone
Some have argued that the parameter values should be fixed by appealing to the prefer-
ences of society, usually as revealed through market behaviour.13 In practice, this means
determining the real risk-free rate of return r and arguing that, under optimal conditions,
r = S DR.14 There are many objections to this methodology, and it is beyond the scope
of this article to enumerate and articulate them fully. However, it is worth introducing
them briefly. For simplicity, we can divide these objections into problems with imple-
mentation and moral objections.
Problems with implementation range from temporal inconsistency of actual indi-
viduals (e.g. Frederick et al. (2002) explain how actual decision-making can and does
diverge from temporally consistent utility functional modelling) to distortionary taxes
(e.g. Portney and Weyant (1999) and ? discuss various methods of approximating the
real risk-free interest rate given that we do not live in a first-best world—e.g. our markets
include taxes and subsidies which distort signals) and from the incompleteness of mar-
kets (e.g. inter alia we lack complete long-term markets, so long-term preferences must
be inferred from medium- or short-term market behaviour) to the inability of markets to
capture non-marginal effects or projects at a global level (e.g. Dietz et al. (2009) point
out that if marginality does not apply, then individual agents do not affect the resultant
outcomes).
Moral objections range from the biased manner in which such a methodology mea-
sures social preferences (e.g. Atkinson (2001); Caney (2008); Quiggin (2008) point out
that employing market interest rates to determine social preferences effectively makes
preferences matter on a one-dollar-one-vote basis instead of one-person-one-vote) to
potential divisions between economic behaviour and relevant values (e.g. either due to
different aims in economic life and moral life or due to behavioural biases or heuris-
tics) and the distinction between intrapersonal discounting and interpersonal discount-
ing (e.g. Dasgupta (2008) suggests that models should distinguish between (plausibly
permissible) intrapersonal discounting and (plausibly impermissible) interpersonal dis-
counting).
I list these objections partially because I endorse them, but more importantly to
contrast them with the response that we can adopt here. Since we assume that weighting
the present agai st the future is a normative question, neither social beliefs nor social
behaviour suffice to determine the answer. In short, it may be the case that society does
not hold the correct moral beliefs.
Phrased this way, this response invites two further lines of thought. Appeals to
13One justification is that preferences revealed through behaviour are likelier to be honest than those
merely stated (Dietz et al. 2009).
14Obviously, this underdetermines values for η and δ, so this is only the starting point of such a method-
ology if we are adopting the social rate of time preference version of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans frame-
work.
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social preference in moral philosophy are often defended in two ways: epistemological
and constructive. The epistemological route is that the average views (either the mode,
the median, or the mean, but sometimes unspecified which) of society are likelier to be
accurate.15 On this route, we assume some belief-independent target and that people’s
average beliefs will be more reliable at hitting this target than any given belief, perhaps
over some given domain.16 The constructive route is that the moral truth is constructed
out of or constituted by the beliefs or values of individuals. On this route, we assume
there is no belief-independent target; instead, the normative truth is a function of the
beliefs or values of society.17 Thus, on this view, it is not surprising if society holds
correct moral beliefs—their being correct is constituted by society’s holding them.18
Either of these answers could in other contexts help buttress the claim that we should
appeal to social preferences but neither of them help here. The constructivism of the sec-
ond route is ruled out by our assumption that the answer is normative, and not merely an
aggregation of societal beliefs or behaviours. In terms of the first route, I would agree
that the beliefs of society would be normatively relevant (even if not normatively deter-
minate), since they could be used to check the plausibility or acceptability of particular
parameter assignments. However, as stated above, it is unconvincing that individual
normative beliefs about weighting the present against the future in a social context can
be read off of market behaviour, even if we assume that individuals have coherent and
consistent beliefs in this domain. Moreover, since parameter assignments are part of a
framework that most individuals do not understand, directly eliciting stated preferences
is, at the very least, challenging.
It is worth considering a proposal of this latter stated preference type. A strong con-
15We can trace this at least as far back as Aristotle (1984, 2033f), from the Politics III.11, 1281b1–10:
For the many, of whom each individual is not a good man, then they meet together may
be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to
which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single pursue. For each
individual among the many has a share of excellence and practical wisdom, and when they
meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands,
and senses, so too with regard to their character and thought. Hence the many are better
judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and some
another, and among them they understand the whole.
16In the jargon, we assume a form of metaethical realism.
17In the jargon, we assume a form of metaethical constructivism.
18I believe that the consequentialism underlying standard economics could be construed in this manner,
roughly with it being normative to satisfy people’s preferences because those are people’s preferences.
However, an alternative—and popular—understanding is that economics is not at all concerned with nor-
mativity, and that economics is concerned with getting people what they want, not critiquing their wanting
of it. I am less certain that this second interpretation is stable, however, since it seems to presuppose that
we should try to get people what they want or that it is valuable to get people what we want. Presumably,
we should do so, once again, because it is what they want, which seems to me like constructivism once
again. Discussion and further relevant citations would be greatly appreciated.
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tender is Kopp and Portnoy (1999), who suggest mock referenda to elicit stated pref-
erences. Information and detailed questions are submitted to selected households. The
questions must be detailed enough that one can infer willingness-to-pay and willingness-
to-accept for various outcomes. They admit that this would require a significant amount
of information to be provided, ranging from potential environmental costs and benefits
to the households in question to international comparison classes, and that this would be
complex and costly to assemble. To illustrate the kind of information required, consider
their suggestions:
For instance, [sample households] should be told that a program that pre-
vents, say, a half-meter increase in sea-level rise will do the most good in
low-lying undeveloped countries such as Bangladesh. . . They might be told
that a policy that helps slow forest secession would be especially valuable
to some countries or parts of countries, but not to others. And, they might
be told that the reduced incidence of vector-borne diseases will do the great-
est good in tropical countries where these diseases would be most likely to
proliferate. (92)
Note that this is before the households would even be informed of the policies under
consideration and how those policies would impact that particular household. On the
one hand, I agree with Kopp and Portnoy that such a basic international understanding
of environmental policy is necessary for households to understand the implications of
policy choices, even at the national or regional level; if their information were limited
to the impacts of policies on a purely regional or national level this could potentially
discount the impacts on environments at greater risk. For this reason, I do not think that
mock referenda where households had a limited understanding of the interrelated nature
of environmental policy would be meaningful or normatively relevant (so I agree with
their strong informational requ rements). On the other hand, the quantity and complex-
ity of such information makes implementation of such a proposal practically difficult or
perhaps unworkable. Kopp and Portnoy are aware of such challenges and, in response,
they suggest that the goal would be to educate the household on a particular issue to the
level of an American senator (i.e. a non-expert who we trust to have some information
on the issue, or at least enough to meaningfully vote on it).19 If such mock referenda
19Although it’s worth noting that, according to former American Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle,
the harried modern American senator may not cut quite so ideal a figure: “You don’t have a clue what’s
on the floor, your staff is whispering in your ears, you’re running onto the floor, then you check with your
leader–you double check–but, just to make triple sure, there’s a little sheet of paper on the clerk’s table:
The leader recommends an aye vote, or a no vote. So you’ve got all these checks just to make sure you
don’t screw up, but even then you screw up sometimes. But, if you’re ever pressed, ‘Why did you vote
that way?’–you just walk out thinking, Oh, my God, I hope nobody asks, because I don’t have a clue”
(Packer 2010, p. 42).
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were successfully run, we could answer pressing environmental concerns by appealing
to the stated preferences of the actual citizenry.
Of course, under our normative assumption, any such mock referendum would not
determine to answer the question of intertemporal valuation. This is because (a) the
questions would need to be carefully framed to distinguish between what the household
prefers for themselves and what they prefer for social or moral decision-making; and
(b) even if this condition were met, what society prefers does not make it morally true.
However, if the first condition were met, I would consider the results to be normatively
important. The reason is that, such households would develop expertise in the sense
I defend in the following section. In particular, they would learn about the theoretical
(and perhaps social and scientific) implications of adopting particular judgments.
However, my more pragmatic concern would be that very few households would
take this responsibility seriously. It is helpful to consider a contrasting case: Nielsen
households, which report their television-watching habits so that American networks
can gauge audience share. Unlike Nielsen households, I doubt that mock environmental
referendum households would be (a) engaged enough to actually do the tedious work of
reading and digesting the information provided to them, or (b) be considered socially
desirable or exciting (Nielsen households know that they influence which television
shows will be renewed, so for some this imbues the drudgery of recording watching
habits with social cachet). Furthermore, inevitably some of the information will be
mathematically or intellectually taxing for non-experts. This will be exacerbated by
the fact that, unlike senators, understanding this information is not the job of these
referendum households. Of course, Kopp and Portnoy could respond that the houses
in their mock referenda would know that they influence actual policies, but for most of
the public (I hypothesize, sadly) environmental policies will be much more abstract and
unimportant than which television shows we will see again next season.
So who both finds these questions interesting and is informed about them? I argue
in the next section that these concerns suggest that parameter assignments should be a
function of those who are closest to these questions, experts.
4 On When to Trust the Experts
In this section, I argue that there are both theoretical and practical benefits to adopting a
methodology which appeals to expert judgment in assigning values to these normative
parameters.
The account of expertise which I endorse holds that, within normative domains,
expertise consists in understanding the theoretical implications (or potentially also the
practical implications) of adopting normative judgments.20 Although I use the term
20A paper I’ve written which is under consideration expands on the summary here.
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“normative experts”, this should be thought of as elliptical for the more perspicuous
but unwieldy “experts in normative domains”. This can be contrasted with expertise
in non-normative domains, where expertise consists in understanding the meaning (in
the jargon, the truth-conditions) of judgments in the domain and knowledge of the rel-
evant states of the world. Experts within both normative and non-normative domains
must have interactional expertise, meaning facility with the basic terms of the domain
and their relationship in such a manner that they can communicate with experts in that
domain (Collins and Evans 2007). In addition, in non-normative domains, expertise
is characterized by having knowledge of the aspects of the world relevant to that do-
main whereas, in normative domains, expertise is characterized by understanding the
theoretical implications of adopting particular judgments. The ideal normative expert
understands both the relevant empirical facts of the situation and the theoretical impli-
cations of adopting particular normative judgments, but of course, one could contribute
relevant normative expertise by understanding only one of these types of implications.21
Who is a normative expert is naturally also a dynamic question; as mentioned above,
one can impart relevant information to a layman to the extent that they become a nor-
mative expert—on one common view, this is the purpose of citizen deliberative bodies
in democratic decision-making. However, I take this to be a more uncommon case;
usually, experts are those who already understand the relevant implications, due to inter
alia training or relevant research interests.
Of course, all of these types of expertise are comparative, so they require an im-
plied contrast class. It is worth noting that my account of normative expertise is in
stark contrast with some more traditional accounts of expertise, which appeal to truth or
knowledge; I discuss this further below.22
In the present context, the upshot is that many (although of course not all!) of
21Along these lines, one way to instantiate this methodology could be to have those who understand
the non-moral theoretical implications (e.g. environmental or welfare economists) of adopting particular
normative judgments explain the potential outcomes and then have those who understand the moral the-
oretical implications (e.g. moral philosophers or theologians) attempt evaluations of these implications.
This is a familiar methodology in contexts such as bioethics, but there are two reasons I think it less appli-
cable here. First, there are issues of complexity (the welfare and risk implications of particular normative
judgments in climate economics can be extremely technical). Second, the framework of Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans assumes consequentialism in general—and discounted utilitarianism in particular. Since we
are adopting the framework (at least hypothetically), there will be relatively few issues of moral theory
that can ground particular value assignments to the normative parameters. In a bioethical context, in
contrast, there are usually several substantive moral theories which are in play.
22Those familiar with this debate will see that I am advocating appeal to ethical expertise over the
stronger (and more “traditional”) moral expertise, although I am calling both versions of normative exper-
tise. The distinction between ethical and moral expertise is that moral experts know (or reliably believe)
the true moral theory, whereas ethical experts merely know candidate moral theories and can apply these
candidates to particular cases. As I assumed that we are operating under normative disagreement and are
unable to identify the moral truths, appeal to moral expertise is unavailable to me; I also suspect that this
assumption obtains in the real world.
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the relevant normative experts in the present contexts would be economists who work
with welfare and climate economics, due to their greater familiarity with the theoreti-
cal implications of the relevant normative judgments (namely, particular value assign-
ments to the normative parameters), would be the relevant experts in this normative
domain.23 Note that, although the judgments at issue here—parameter assignments in
welfare economics—are directly related to economic, normative expertise about these
judgments need not be limited to economists. Whoever understands relevant implica-
tions (or more precisely, to the extent that they understand the relevant implications)
would possess normative expertise in the relevant sense. Among others, this is likely
to include legal analysts and social scientists, although to a lesser extent than working
economists since the relevant implications concern the importance of these parameters
within broader economic theory. For instance, in the simple Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans
framework, the utility function is not only relevant for comparisons of intergenerational
consumption, but also for risk-aversion. Those who know the ways that various param-
eter assignments have implications for ideal savings rates or the cost-effectiveness of
particular policies, for instance, are also likelier to have experience working with the
relevant models. However, to be consistent with our initial normative assumption, we
cannot say that this type of expertise is likelier to make their preferences morally true.
Since this notion is comparative, we can constrain our population of experts depend-
ing on how informed we want our expert preferences to be. For instance, if we wanted
a very high level of expertise, we could consult so-called blue ribbon economists who
specialize in this topic and have extensive experience examining the details of various
parameter assignments. This has already been done in this context (e.g. Arrow et al.
2013, 2012, 2014; Weitzman 2001). If we wanted a broader population to draw from,
we could appeal to economists in general (e.g. Weitzman 2001).24 However, in line
with the intention of drawing a broader community of relevant experts, Drupp et al.
(2015) have adopted a methodology which is more conducive to the position I espouse:
to select those who have published articles with relevant keywords.Drupp et al. (2015)
thus select their sample in such a way that the results are not limited to economists,
since non-economists may have written or co-written papers which are relevant to dis-
counting. For my purposes, this is a strength of this selection process; those who are
familiar with the economic implications of particular parameter assignments need not
all be economists. I expand on some examples of expert elicitation in §5.
It is also important to note that methodological consistency urges consistent ap-
proaches to the different normative parameters. I endorse what Dasgupta (2008, p. 159)
23Of course, I am not the first to suggest this. Recently, Pindyck (2015) and Sunstein (2014) have
endorsed more appeal to expert preferences in the context of discounting. Thanks to Moritz Drupp for
drawing my attention to these.
24(Weitzman 2001) includes both more general economic elicitation as well as blue ribbon elicitation.
In the sense of expertise relevant here, the latter are more justifiably labelled as “normative experts”,
although it is a weakness from my point of view that it limits the pool exclusively to economists.
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points out, namely, that assigning a value to η on the basis of revealed preference but as-
signing a value to δ based on moral principles and theory is “neither good economics nor
good philosophy”. So one can be methodologically consistent by adopting a descriptive
approach to both (which is ruled out by our assumption that these are genuinely norma-
tive parameters) or by adopting a prescriptive approach to both. There are different ways
to be prescriptive, but adopting expert elicitation is an obvious candidate, and adopting
it for all of the normative parameters thus has an advantage over any mixed approach.
The reasons for appealing to this conception of expert judgment in the context of nor-
mative parameter assignments are multiple: first, it encourages transparency in method-
ology; second, it encourages coherent social planning where parameter assignments
like η cannot be settled by argumentation; and third, it applies with minimal metaethi-
cal and moral presumptions; and finally, it holds pragmatic advantages over descriptive
methodologies.
The first reason is about transparency. In climate economic modelling—as with
many other types of modelling—there are many degrees of freedom, and there may be
political pressures to assign values to the normative parameters to fit particular precon-
ceived ends (Pindyck 2015). Appeal to normative experts in general allows both the
given modeller to contribute their preferences to the assignment to these parameters as
well as the check of non-unilateral parameter assignments. This separates the judgments
which rely explicitly on values from those that do not. Such separation can also increase
the trustworthiness of such estimates (cf. Reiss 2014).
A closely related, but stronger, version of this worry is that climate economists are
unable to explicate their value-judgments, perhaps because these permeate their analysis
or perhaps because the terms are thick, with inextricable evaluative and non-evaluative
components (cf. Dasgupta 2005, 2009; Putnam and Walsh 2007). More generally, pre-
scriptive approaches are meant to avoid disguising normative judgments under claims
of empirical objectivity. In this context, Stern (2007, 2015) can exemplify a laudable at-
tempt at explicating his normative judgments (labelling them such) and defending them
(as well as in Stern 2014). This is at best an existence proof and it might not convince all
such detractors, but it is suggestive. Furthermore, the influence of (Stern 2007) has led
and presumably will continue to lead to more explicit discussions of the ethical assump-
tions underpinning such analyses. This can also be done with expert elicitation surveys,
if they are done with fine-grained questions, as with (Drupp et al. 2015). This allows
us to determine important distinctions such as whether given expert judgments are to be
read as prescriptive (as opposed to descriptive, for instance). This last point is a signifi-
cant worry with previous expert elicitation exercises, since the basis for prescriptive and
descriptive normative parameter assignments are not directly comparable (Freeman and
Groom 2014). This can be seen in the fact that the prescriptivists and descriptivists can
broadly agree on the empirical data (e.g. market interest rates) without agreeing on their
implications for assignments to these parameters. Of course, none of these remarks are
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intended to substitute for standard sensitivity analyses to variations in these parameter
assignments.
The second reason is that normative experts will be able to sketch both more com-
prehensive and more consistent social plans. In defining this term, I can appeal to the
figure in welfare economics we call a social planner and say whatever it is that we
usually think she should design is a social plan. Normative experts understand more
implications of adopting particular parameter assignments. The importance of this un-
derstanding is that experts will be able to able to fit particular parameter assignments
into coherent social plans. Coherency is obviously not sufficient to make a social plan
good or desirable—it is trivial to generate coherent social plans which we would reject.
But my rather minimal normative claim is that coherency is necessary for social plans.
If this is so, expert preferences should be, ahem, preferred to general social preferences.
Taking η as an example, I would suggest that this is a very sensible methodology
to adopt. As argued before (cf. Figure 1), we cannot generate arguments that establish
particular values of η (assuming that conditions like these parameter assignments are
genuinely normative hold). To simplify slightly, all we have are various risk-tolerances
for society, supported by particular intuitions or value-judgments.25 However, parame-
ter assignments for η have implications for savings and investment behaviour as well as
potentially responses under types of risk. Since normative experts understand (some of)
these implications, they can test them for coherency with inter alia observed behaviour
under risk and theoretical distributions of investment and savings. In the ideal case,
economic experts are aware of the parameter assignments that are suggested by social
behaviours but can, among other things, adjust these values to account for various be-
havioural biases. In other words, experts can treat social preferences as normatively
relevant, but not normatively determin te. Of course, none of this means that norma-
tive experts will know the normative truth, but on the minimal assumption that social
coherency of planning is necessary for truth, this favours my methodology.
A third reason is that this methodology is purposefully neutral in metaethical as-
sumptions. For instance, in moral philosophy, some argue that moral expertise is pos-
sible (e.g. Driver 2013; Singer 1972) and others deny it (e.g. Weinberg et al. 2010;
Williams 1995). They discuss moral expertise in terms of having normative knowledge
or true normative positions, whereas this more ecumenical account of expertise can re-
main agnostic about the outcome of that debate while still offering a substantive and
potentially illuminating account of normative expertise.26 Intuitively, knowing the im-
25There is a critical value of η = ∞ which can be argued for. It ends up representing something like
an intergenerational Rawlsian Difference Principle, but I set this aside since the inter-temporal implica-
tions would be absurd (for instance, no net savings and/or almost no mitigation at all) (cf. Arrow 1973;
Dasgupta 1974).
26It is also likely—although not logically necessitated—that experts on those accounts would be a sub-
set of the experts on my account, since those who endorse “the” true substantive normative positions
are likely to have reflected on alternative positions and so know the consequences of adopting different
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plications of adopting particular substantive normative positions is independent of one’s
adoption or rejection of those positions.
Another related advantage of this account of normative expertise is that it does not
commit one to any metaethical position. Regardless of whether you accept normative
realism or anti-realism (such as constructivism or non-cognitivism), you can accept nor-
mative expertise construed as understanding the theoretical implications of normative
judgments. This is not true with traditional forms of normative expertise, which require
knowledge of the normative facts, presupposing a form realism. I suspect this is also
more congenial at this disciplinary interface, since it seems to me that normative realism
is better represented among philosophers than among economists.
A fourth benefit is that, unlike with non-experts, those familiar with the theoreti-
cal economic implications should be more easily able to distinguish between their per-
sonal utility function (and associated risk-aversion) and an ideal social welfare func-
tion. For non-experts, these may be difficult to distinguish, and it is difficult to design
non-technical questions which are aimed at questions of social welfare and not at an
individual’s personal utility function. For instance, some have advocated finding val-
ues of η based on the inferred risk-aversion of market actors or psychological results.
But this is clearly problematic if we distinguish between the question of how society
should decide and how individuals decide. One important way that these two can come
apart is that individuals are susceptible to preferences which are inconsistent in terms
of risk or intertemporal trade-offs, whereas presumably we intend social decisions to be
consistent.27
Again the claim is not that what the experts believe necessarily tracks the normative
truth more than non-experts or society at large. That would not be consistent with the
assumption of genuine normative uncertainty assumed. Just as the claim that “Societal
exhibits such-and-such savings and investment behaviour” leaves the normative ques-
tion “How should a social planner invest in various mitigation and adaptation projects?”
open, so does “Experts state that they have such-and-such social preferences over long
term decision-making” leaves the same normative question open. However, this ties in
with other worries that should be addressed.
The first, and I think most important, objection to this type of account draws on
worries about economic expertise. There are two strains that this worry often takes:
a worry about special biases that arise in the field of economics, and a worry about
creeping technocracy.
Philosophers often worry about particular biases that arise in the field of economics.
substantive positions. The converse is less likely: given that there is divergence among substantive nor-
mative positions adopted, even among those who reflect on alternatives, only those which correspond
more closely with the normative truth would belong to moral experts on their accounts.
27This point is not without its detractors. Arrow et al. (2013, 2014), for instance, suggest using a de-
clining discount rate, which under some circumstances generate intertemporally inconsistent evaluations.
This potential implication appears problematic from a decision-theoretic point of view.
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Since I am interested in questions that arise given the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans frame-
work, many of the foundational assumptions are beyond the scope of this essay (for
instance welfarism, consequentialism, and anthropocentrism).
Another familiar concern is that economists—as with almost any other type of
specialist—are subject to overconfidence in their own judgments and that their policy
predictions could suffer as a result. (Of course, as mentioned, the normative experts will
not exclusively be economists, although they are likely to be disproportionately repre-
sented.) A modern form of this argument, surveying some of the relevant behavioural
psychology research, comes from Angner (2006), but these are familiar themes from
Hayek. These worries have been reinforced by recent (perhaps unreasonable) public ex-
pectations that macroeconomics should have been able to predict the recent recession—
or that once it occurred, economics could speak with a consistent voice about what
policy would ameliorate it.28 I share concerns that economists may be overconfident in
their predictions of macroeconomic parameters and/or social impacts of various policies
(Jimenez-Buedo 2014; Reiss 2014). However, it is important to note that these are not
the parameters under consideration. For instance, the value of the parameter g, the real
per capita growth rate of consumption, is a parameter for which overconfidence could
be a problem. But overconfidence is not relevant in the same way to normative parame-
ters, since overconfidence requires that there is a measurable standard by which one can
fail, and—by assumption—normative parameters are not determined by any empirically
measurable phenomena.
In practice, one might be worried that, since much depends on the discount rates
that society adopts, there could be corruption of expert elicitation—e.g. by trying to
have interested parties be legitimated as experts or by spuriously publishing papers with
“discounting” as a keyword by lobbyists so as to include them. This can be thought of
as an application of Goodhart’s law that “When a measure becomes a target, it ceases
to become a good measure” because interested parties will attempt to hijack it. This is
a potentially serious practical issue, but it is worth thinking about it in comparison with
alternative methodologies, such as the referenda approach of Kopp and Portnoy (1999).
Non-experts are much easier to persuade with sophomoric reasoning than experts, so
it could be difficult to prevent representative households from being convinced by de-
termined well-financed interests. In contrast, publishing papers in recognized journals
is difficult; it would represent a fairly high barrier of entry for such parties. Similarly,
while it might well be the case that it is possible to introduce ersatz experts into surveys,
it could be difficult to mass produce them in such a way that they would pass any level
of scrutiny. So while this is a concern that should be considered in practice by expert
elicitation exercises, it seems comparatively challenging for interested parties to have
28I am not myself sure whether this is a fair charge. For instance, British economists were
at least fairly united in that the British policy was failing, cf. http://cfmsurvey.org/surveys/
importance-elections-uk-economic-activity.
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substantial influence.
The final objection I will address here is that, dialectically, there is no advantage to
expert elicitation over social preference elicitation given by appealing to coherent social
plans. The reason is that social plans are plans of society, so there is an important (al-
though trivial) sense in which social plans developed as a function of social preferences
will be more coherent. I agree that there is a sense in which this is true, since social pref-
erences (if we can effectively and correctly infer them) will cohere better with current
market behavior. However, this is a limited effect, since intertemporal social behav-
ior is rarely internally coherent (just consider inconsistencies in risk-aversive behavior).
In exchange for this type of (I believe limited) social coherency, we lose potential co-
herency and determinacy in social plans themselves. Some will be willing to accept this
trade-off, but it seems to me unappealing, especially in light of the advantages that ex-
perts in welfare economics can bring to the table. Furthermore, I suspect (and certainly
hope) that welfare economists whose preferences are elicited are both interested in, and
consider, the empirical data that could be used to inform their normative judgments.
5 Some Examples of Expert Elicitation
I was very pleased to discover after having begun this project that the type of method-
ology that I advocate is—while still fairly young—being performed in the economic
literature. It behooves me to briefly discuss the exercises that have been performed in
light of this discussion.
Weitzman (2001) suggests—somewhat tongue-in-cheek—a rather pessimistic view
of expertise: “with very little exaggeration or cynicism, an ‘expert’ here might be de-
fined as an economist who knows the literature well enough to be able to justify any
reasonable social discount rate by some internally consistent story” (261). His survey
was given over a large (N > 2160 from “about 2800” requests) “professional Ph.D.-level
economist” sample and a smaller (N = 50) named blue-ribbon sample. One thing that
strikes me as helpful throughout the expertise elicitation exercises performed to date is
that this sample seems to self-select; for instance, “the most common objection from
respondents was their complaint that they were ‘not an expert in this area’ and conse-
quently ‘have no idea’ what to answer” (267). Insofar as this indicates some epistemic
humility and was the most common objection, I think it serves to the credit of those
respondents and is some evidence against worries about overconfidence that many have
made.29 Contra Weitzman, I think it is not best to include these respondents regardless
(Weitzman tried to convince those who answered in this way to give a response); I think
we should take those seriously who claim not to be experts. Perhaps—although we can-
29In terms of the whole population, Weitzman suggests that approximately twelve percent were answer-
ing “under duress”, so the most that we can conclude is that the largest plurality of this twelve percent
were claiming lack of expertise.
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not know—they did not consider themselves experts because they had not reflected on
potential values and/or they were not familiar with the theoretical implications of adopt-
ing particular values. If that were so, then they would have (less) expertise in my sense
and so it would be sensible to exclude them. (The results found for the large sample
were a mean µ = 3.96% with a standard deviation σ = 2.94% and for the blue ribbon
sample mean µ = 4.09% with a standard deviation σ = 3.07%.)30 Of course, a major
disadvantage of this study is that only economists were consulted in both samples, but,
even more importantly, the economists considered were not necessarily expert in the
sense relevant here: with respect to discounting, intertemporal valuation, and (climate)
cost-benefit analyses.
There is less to say about the blue ribbon panel held at RFF in 2012 (Arrow et al.
2012) which was developed into recommendations in (Arrow et al. 2013) and (Arrow
et al. 2014). All of these members are easily thought of as experts in my sense (prob-
ably in many others), having worked with welfare economics, its assumptions, and its
theoretical interconnections for many years. Again, it may be that their level of famil-
iarity with the implications of adopting particular normative judgments are matched by
non-economists, but this is unlikely. Their conclusion is that, to accommodate future
uncertainty about consumption growth rates and investment rates of return, declining
discount rates are applicable.
Finally, the most recent expert elicitation exercise performed by Drupp et al. (2015)
has several advantageous features. The most obvious is that selection via relevant key-
words in publications does not limit the sample to economists (although it does limit
the working timeframe by publication date). Another feature is that they elicit the
components of the Ramsey formula, allowing to distinguish between S DR-level and
component-level responses. Yet another is explicitly asking sample members to what
extent they believe prescriptive and descriptive considerations apply to determination of
the social discount rate. This was a similar large-scale survey (N = 197 out of a pool
of 627 requests), and a large majority (80%) believe both prescriptive and descriptive
considerations are relevant and the modal response (N = 42) was both should have
equal weight on a scale of 0 to 100.31 If we take this mix seriously, I think that ex-
pert elicitation is well-justified, since experts in discounting are likeliest to be aware of
the relevant empirical data to discounting, but can potentially adduce normative consid-
erations and/or account or adjust for inconsistencies in social behaviour. I fully grant
that this is a best-case scenario, and many experts may not reflect this carefully, but
non-experts are unlikely to be able to perform either of these tasks in any case.
For my purposes, Weitzman’s, Arrow et al.’s and Drupp et al.’s blue-ribbon exper-
im nts can more easily defended as (relevant) expert elicitation methods, with Drupp
et al.’s as the most defensible, since he allows for some non-economists with relevant
30The mean is indicated by µ and the standard deviation is σ.
31Part of this modality could be explained by the high salience of assigning both 50.
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research interests. Determining who to include as an expert into a sample is non-trivial,
but it seems to me that Drupp et al.’s methodology is a good first approximation of the
relevant population. The premise required is that those who know the consequences of
adopting particular normative judgments in parameter assignments are also those who
publish on discounting (in the journals considered). Obviously, this is neither concep-
tually nor logically true, but as an approximation, it seems defensible. It is far more
helpful than Weitzman’s general economics PhD population, many of whom may have
little or no relevant expertise (as can be gleaned from their responses to Weitzman).
Methodologies of the style of Drupp et al. could help break the deadlock in evaluating
the impacts of climate—and other social—policies.
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